I’m surprised no one has taken issue with my contention that St. Thomas’s theological and philosophical genius lay in part in its de-coupling God from creation, such that creation could be encountered and explained without direct reference to the divine. After all, did not Thomas give us the 5 Ways? And do these not explicitly argue for the existence of God in terms of Cause (God) and Effect (the Universe)?
Well, just in case anyone was wondering, here’s my thought. . . . (By the way, I don’t offer this as in any way a scholar of Thomas and so welcome engagement by any who think I am mistaken).
St. Thomas Aquinas’ five ways are often considered to be arguments for the existence of God and they can and often do function as such in philosophy of religion. Sometimes these arguments fare quite well; other times, they do not. Contra Richard Dawkins—who dismisses a barely undergraduate-level caricature of Aquinas’ arguments in three pages—and with Keith Ward—who ably dispenses with the dismissal in a slightly longer chapter—I am inclined to agree that the five ways can be re-articulated to modern audiences. In the light of the findings of modern science the five ways rightly understood continue to provide compelling, if not conclusive, reasons to believe that the existence of God is almost certain. To stay here, at the level of scepticism, however, is, I think to miss the real point that Thomas was making 800 years ago. A point that remains valid for our discussion.
Pace both Dawkins and Ward, I am not so sure that arguing for the existence of God was precisely what St. Thomas was up to when he set forth the five ways in the third article of the second question of the Summa Theologiae. What then does St. Thomas mean when he says that there are five ways in which the existence of God can be proved? To work toward an answer, it is important to keep in mind that St. Thomas is not arguing with atheists. He is not a modern-out-of-time. Thomas’ contention lies with other believers who thought either that God’s existence was self-evident (this is Anselm’s ontological argument), or that God’s existence could not be determined through examination of the natural world and was instead a matter to be accepted entirely on faith (Aquinas cites St. John of Damascus here). Thomas is arguing against fellow believers, wanting to show in his five ways that we can arrive at God from close observation of the world around us. Awareness of God’s existence is not a matter of mere definition—existence is not a predicate; nor is it simply to be taken on faith. Awareness of God’s existence inevitably emerges through a close investigation of the world God has made.
This, I think, gets us much closer to Thomas’ real point. While there is a claim being made about the demonstrability of God’s existence (though it is not quite a precursor of the theist/atheist debate), there is (and this is much more important for my purposes) a claim being made about the nature of humanity. Namely, that our minds are so ordered toward the natural world that, as we attend to it closely, we will be led almost hook-in-nose to consider what lies beyond it, to what we cannot observe, to that which transcends sensory perception. We cannot help but operate in this way, says Thomas. It simply is part of who we are. In arguing thus, Thomas initiates a revolution in Christian thought by arguing that the road to God lies in turning toward the natural world rather than away from it. Indeed, it is the decisive turn away from Neo-Platonic Augustinianism to Aristotle’s empiricism and materialism that, when coupled with a Christian doctrine of creation, laid the philosophical and theological groundwork for the emergence of the natural sciences in Europe (and not elsewhere).
I don’t want to look at the particulars of the 5 ways. I want to focus on how this turn to the natural world works itself out. When we observe the world, Thomas says, its intricacy, order and almost inherent sense of purpose invites questions about intent and design. What ordered the universe? What imbued its consciousless creatures with meaning? The answer is that which Christians call God (the first way). Further investigation reveals that the universe is composed of an intricate connection of causes and effects. And this recognition invites yet more questions, this time about the universe’s formal, efficient, material and final causation (the remaining four ways). Who conceived of the universe, brought it into being, provided the matter for its construction, and toward whom it is directed? Again, the answer to these questions is what Christians call God.
Even though this is the briefest summary of the five ways, I hope I have expressed them accurately and clarified my point. St. Thomas thinks that human beings are naturally oriented to know both the natural world and, in and through the pursuit of that knowledge, to seek after its ultimate source, the transcendent, what he names as God. In turning us away from Neo-Platonic and Augustinian inwardness and illumination to empirical investigation, Thomas is not attempting to prove God’s existence to a medieval atheist (as there were none). Rather, he is providing a large conceptual map for questions he believes to be universal. Questions to which he can go provide distinctly Christian answers, as he does in the rest of the Summa. This is, of course, exactly what is to be expected from a member of the Order of Preachers, given that their mission is evangelism through teaching and preaching.
If I am reading Thomas correctly, he thus gives the world intelligibility in its own right–it can be accounted for in terms of itself–and explains why humans are hardwired to allow this intelligibility to provoke different sorts of questions. Thus, to say theories of the universe don’t need a creator in order to be true is-to me–entirely proper and is perfectly compatible with believing in God without resort to fideism.
Am I on the right track here?
I remember you presenting a view like this on CETA-L, years ago, Tim. I like it. I never liked to think of Thomas’s proofs as being intended as necessarily convincing arguments, because they never really seemed airtight to me. Yet I somehow came to like and respect Thomas’s way of thinking, so I’m happy to rehabilitate his five ways to prove the existence of God.
I seem to remember that you wanted to interpret ‘prove’ in the sense of ‘test’ or ‘probe’, rather than of ‘demonstrate with certainty’. I don’t know whether his original language really bears that interpretation, but I’m sure you’re right to point out that whatever he was doing, it probably wasn’t arguing with atheists. And I think maybe Thomas would agree that his subject is much more important than his own intellectual stature. So whatever Thomas meant by his five ways, it may be that your take on them is the one worth taking away today.
On the one hand I think you have a good counterpoint to Intelligent Design, which seems to me to amount to Incompetent Design. The mind of God must be so far beyond human concepts of intelligence, that the designs of God could not be recognized by humans as design. But on the other hand I don’t think this means that the universe is simply alien and unfathomable to the human mind. We can understand it to an astonishing degree — just not by thinking that it is the kind of thing one of us might possibly have made, given merely the power.
So I particularly like what I take to be your main point, that it is worth looking very closely at creation, because to probe nature is to probe, in part, the nature of God.
Nice to have a bona fide physicist telling me I’m not out to lunch! Seriously, thanks James. Good to hear from you again.
Hi Tim,
I’ve been thinking about your recent posts on what you describe as St. Thomas’s decoupling of God from creation. I have a couple of comments.
1. What you’ve written about Thomas’s five ways as Thomas arguing against self-evidence (Anselm’s ontological argument) and fideism (St. John of Damascus) whereby Thomas makes his important turn to the natural world makes good sense. But (and please take the following with a large grain of salt because I haven’t studied Thomas’s work and his context deeply), I do think that Thomas was arguing against an atheist position, if not particular atheists. This seems to come across in a plain reading of the text (though I could be wrong here, because I’m no Thomas scholar). That is, he talks proving the existence of God and he sets out deductive arguments. Also, and more importantly it seems to me, if Thomas’s argument is (as you’ve argued) a turn-to-the-natural-world replacement for, or competitor to, Anselm’s argument, then it seems clear that because Anselm’s argument directly addresses the atheist position (“the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God”), so Thomas’s arguments would too. So it still seems to me that Thomas is setting out an argument for God’s existence. Of course, Thomas may very well have also thought that, as you say, “human beings are naturally oriented to know both the natural world and, in and through the pursuit of that knowledge, to seek after its ultimate source, the transcendent, what he names as God.” It may be that St. Thomas is doing both projects, and isn’t distinguishing between these projects. (Again, please take what I’ve written with a large grain of salt.)
2. I would like to address your previous post where you wrote the following in response to the claim that none of the scientific theories of the universe’s origin require a Creator: “the natural world can and even should be explained without recourse to the divine. ‘God’ is not a stopgap in human ignorance.” Let me first say (as an aside) that I think that metaphysical explanations can be set out for thinking that God exists, e.g., as an answer to the metaphysical question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Let me also say (as an aside) that I think that the doing of science per se can be explained well metaphysically by God: i.e., it makes good sense to appeal to a divine Mind to account for the orderly properties of the universe (its lawfulness), the legitimacy of induction (pace Hume), our ability to know the universe (albeit fallibly and non-exhaustively), etc. Having said this (and thus having acknowledged the importance of philosophical arguments for God, but now leaving them in the background), I would like to ask (finally, in response to your response above): Should we always explain the natural world without recourse to the divine? Yes, God-of-the-gaps explanations are arguments from ignorance and should be avoided. But avoided at all costs? If, say, God really did create the universe a finite time ago, and if, say, God subsequently really did act in the world in a special way (e.g., to create the first living cell), and if God left traces of Himself in the heavens and on the earth (as the Scriptures seem to suggest), and if science could discern good evidence of these traces of divine Mind (lots of ifs, I know)—if these were all the case, yet science is never allowed to provide explanations that involve intelligence (whether divine or merely supernatural intelligence, whether omni-competent or just apparently somewhat competent )—would our scientific theories miss something important? It seems to me that they would. Our theories would always be filling real intelligent causal gaps, i.e., actual gaps in the capacities of the non-intelligent causal fabric of the universe, with non-intelligent causes, even when positive evidence were pointing to actual intelligent causation. This strikes me as odd. I would describe it as a non-intelligent-cause gagging of what the universe might actually have to say. (Yes, I have sympathies with the intelligent design folks over at the Discovery Institute.) Also, it seems to me that the principle under discussion—i.e. the principle that the natural world can and even should be explained without recourse to the divine—would also rule out the legitimacy of historical investigation telling us that a miracle such as Jesus’ resurrection occurred and was actually supernaturally caused. This strikes me as odd, too. (For more on this, see my .) All this to say that I think the scientific principle should be revised to say something like this: the natural world can and even should be explained without recourse to the divine only insofar as the empirical evidence warrants this, but if the empirical evidence warrants recourse to the divine, then the divine explanation should be the way to go (tentatively, and open to correction).
That’s my two cents’ worth!
Best regards,
Hendrik
P.S. I’ve recently done part 1 of a 2-part (perhaps 3-part) series on the God-of-the-gaps objection over at my column . Maybe some of what I’ve written there will be of interest.
I think I messed up putting my links into the text, though they do work (the link in the main body goes to my dissertation, the link in the postscript goes to my column). My parenthetical comment near the end of the main text is supposed to read: “For more on this, see my dissertation.”
on technical matters, Hendrik, I wonder if it was the links that bumped your original comments to my spam file. Anyway, I have found them and they are up now.
I do think we need to take audience into account both with Thomas and with Anselm. In THomas’s case, he is talking to people who already believe, who are exemplified in Anselm and the Damascene. His arguments have to do with how we come to know God, not whether GOd exists. The same can be said for Anselm. In his case, the “ontological argument” is not really an argument at all. It is a prayer and his audience is God. And specifically, it is a prayer for wisdom (hence the citation of the fool) that Anselm might come to understand what he already believes. I think that context has to be taken as seriously as the content of the “arguments” themselves. You end up with something that, while it might be adapted to modern theist/atheist debates isn’t really about that in the first instance. And as a theologian, I find those first instances far more interesting. But that’s just me.
Hello again Tim. I’m not (yet) persuaded by your argument. Here are some reasons that still hold me back. Thomas begins his passage on the five ways, writing “The existence of God can be proved in five ways.” Also, in the previous article of question two, Thomas addresses the question whether “we cannot demonstrate the existence of God.” Also, in following Aristotle, Thomas probably was aware of views that are atheistic-leaning (I’m thinking of the Atomists). In addition, Thomas’s lack of live atheist audience may account for the shortness of his arguments. In view of these points, I continue to think that his arguments are not so much about, as you say, how we come to know God, but how we come to know that God (exists), though we can come to know God via knowing that God is. Again, these are my I’m-not-a-Thomas scholar thoughts, to be taken with the grain of salt I mentioned above. Best regards.
P.S. If you have any thoughts about my point 2 (in my first comment), please let me know. The God-of-the-gaps objection interests me.
I agree that the matter at stake is about how we know that God exists (or perhaps better, where that knowledge is located). But when a guy says, I’m going to talk to Bill (or in THomas’ case, Anselm and JOhn of Damascus), I think we’re wise to take him seriously and not say, “Sorry, you’re really talking to Bob.” I don’t mean to make light of your point. I’m just looking for an easy example.
So, Anselm says we know God exists by paying attention to grammar. The Damascene says we know it on faith. THomas says, we know it by turning to the natural world. In other words, the natural world and the natural way we speak about it, lead us to God. But even this investigation tells us precious little. Hence the need for God to tell us about himself.
This is not quite the same thing as proving the existence of God simply because the existence of God is not the issue. What is at issue is where to look for God. As I have said, these arguments can be pressed into service against atheists. Keith Ward does a decent job of summarzing why they can in his book against Dawkins. I just don’t think that’s what Thomas intended.Not least because, he is very good–pedantic even–about telling us what he intends. And he does so here. He names Anselm and John of Damascus. He does not name the Atomists.
On the God of the Gaps, I am not an expert. I do think that a strong doctrine of Creation requires us to say that natural events should be accounted for in terms of natural causes (science) and should be accounted for in terms of God (metaphysics). But this does not mean science is metaphysics or vice versa. And scientists (Dawkins) and theologians (Paley) both miss the point when they confuse them. I think this is actually a pretty minor p[oint.
Thanks for your reply, Tim.
About the five ways, I will consider your thoughts more deeply when I next examine Thomas’s work.
About the “strong doctrine of Creation,” I am inclined to think that to avoid having a presupposed doctrine keep us from discerning special acts of God in the creation, if such acts happen to occur, scientific reasoning should be open to acknowleding such acts if (and only if) there is good evidence for them. This is a topic that interests me. I was spurred on to write my above comments because I found that your initial claim, i.e., the claim that “the natural world can and even should be explained without recourse to the divine,” would not allow us to recognize a divine act in the natural world if such an act occurred and if we had good evidence for the act. This claim would also be problematic for investigating a miracle such as Jesus’ resurrection, where the event in the natural world is more plausibly explained via recourse to the supernatural than to natural causes only.
I will stop. It’s been great talking with you!
I don’t think we disagree much, actually. I think that with respect to science, God acts more as a presupposition (he makes the whole enterprise work) than a potential hypothesis that accounts for this or that event. (I’ve just picked up Plantinga’s new book where this is one of the claims he makes).
On miracles–yes, I believe in their theoretical possibility and in some cases, that they occur(red). I don’t confess the creed with my fingers crossed. But I don’t think the natural sciences can hand us God on a plate because their intelligibility requires that creation be independent of God and accounted for independently of God (this is what I mean by a strong doctrine of Creation).
What this means is, while I believe Jesus is raised, I do not think a biologist could (or should even try to) give us some sort of hypothesis that is open to further verification or falsification through experimentation to prove that God raised Jesus from the grave. Nor do I think that believers should wait until such a hypothesis and research programme should be offered. I think it is a matter for which the tools of the natural scientist are not fitted to investigate. It is a matter for the metaphysician and the theologian.